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NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? INTERPRETING THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Abstract: Japan finally seems to be pulling itself out of its “lost
decade” (and a half) of economic stagnation. Some grudgingly or
triumphantly attribute this to micro-economic reforms, freeing up
arthritic markets, although there is also evidence that macroeconomic policy failures have been a major cause of poor
performance since the 1990s. Many point to overlapping
transformations in corporate governance, broadly defined to cover
relationships among managers and employees as well as between
firms and outside shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders.
These relationships are in flux, with moves arguably favouring
shareholders and more market-driven control mechanisms.
It has certainly been a “found decade” for law reform in Japan,
particularly in corporate law, with a plethora of legislative
amendments commencing around 1993 and culminating in the
enactment of a consolidated “Company Law” in 2005. This
“modernisation” project, particularly since 2001, is reportedly
aimed at (i) securing better corporate governance; (ii) bringing the
law into line with a highly-developed information society; (iii)
liberalising fundraising measures; (iv) bringing corporate law into
line with the internationalization of corporate activity; and (v)
modernizing terms and consolidating corporate law. Because the
suite of revisions has moved away from strict mandatory rules set
out originally in Japan’s Commercial Code of 1899, modeled
primarily on German law, another growing perception is that
Japanese corporate law and practice is or will soon be converging
significantly on US models.

i

However, assessments remain divided as to whether these moves
in corporate governance and capitalism more generally in Japan
amount to a new paradigm or “regime shift”. Focusing primarily
on quite influential commentary in English, Part I of this paper
outlines two pairs of views. It concludes that the most plausible
assessment is of significant but “gradual transformation” towards
a more market-driven approach, evident also in other advanced
political economies.
Drawing more generally from these often virulently divided views,
Part II sets out five ways forward through the proliferating
literature and source material on corporate governance in Japan.
Particular care must be taken in: (i) selecting the temporal
timeframe, (ii) selecting countries to compare, (iii) balancing blackletter law and broader socio-economic context, (iv) reflecting on
and disclosing normative preferences, and (v) giving weight to
processes as well as outcomes, when assessing change in Japan –
and any other country’s governance system.
Part III ends with a call for further research particularly on lawand policy-producing processes, rather than mainly outcomes. It
also outlines the usefulness of this analytical framework for
analysing the broader field of Corporate Social Responsibility, now
emerging as the next major area of debate and transformation in
Japan - as elsewhere.
Keywords: corporate governance, comparative law, Japan
Dr. Luke Nottage
Co-Director, Australian Network for Japanese Law
Email: luken@uow.edu.au
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NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? INTERPRETING THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE*
Dr Luke Nottage#

INTRODUCTION
Japan has recently reappeared on the radar screen of comparative
corporate governance debates, including in the writings of
commentators in Australia. Two main reasons can be imagined for
this renewed interest. One is contemporary concern about the
perceived excesses of the Anglo-American model of corporate
governance, focused on maximizing shareholder value, in the
wake of widespread corporate collapses in the US and Australia.
Japan has regained attention as promising a broader-based
“stakeholder” model, giving weight also to the interests of core
employees, creditors (especially the so-called “main banks”), key
suppliers and customers (especially those in keiretsu corporate
groups) {Acquaah-Gaisie 2005: 43}. Indeed, with the Australia-US
Free Trade Agreement recently entering in force, fears of further
excessive “Americanisation of Australian corporate law” (cf {von
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Nessen 1999}) have led to calls for Australia to contest
convergence by drawing on stakeholder models reportedly more
prevalent in our region, notably in Japan {Clarke 2005: 118-29}.
This possibility is reinforced by the potential for a full-scale FTA
between Australia and Japan, leveraging off the looser AustraliaJapan Trade and Economic Framework agreed upon in 2003.1 A
second reason for greater interest recently in Japanese corporate
governance is that its vast economy – still many times larger than
China’s, for example – seems finally to be pulling itself out of its
“lost decade” (and a half) of economic stagnation. Indeed, the
author of “Japan: The System that Soured” {Katz 1998} now argues
that it will stun the world in its economic renaissance, albeit
probably not for another decade – following a “tumultuous battle”
at the political level {Katz 2003: 10}.
However, some grudgingly or triumphantly attribute incipient
economic revival precisely to Japan’s micro-economic reforms in
freeing up arthritic markets {The Economist, 2005 #190}, although
there is also good evidence that macro-economic policy failures
were a major cause of poor economic performance since the 1990s
{Lincoln
2003}.
Relatedly,
many
highlight
overlapping
transformations in corporate governance towards greater primacy
being accorded to shareholders and equity markets, noting for
example declines in stable and cross-shareholdings, rapid growth
in foreign shareholders, and more activism from Japanese
institutional shareholders. In addition, it has certainly been a
“found decade” for law reform in Japan, particularly in corporate
law. A plethora of statutory amendments has been enacted,
outlined in Appendix A2, commencing around 1993 and

1

Both countries embarked in April 2005 on a formal feasibility study into a
comprehensive FTA: see <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/fta/index.html>.
2
Details of many of these changes are provided in {Nottage 2001}, updated and
developed in {Nottage and Wolff 2005} (both now available via www.ssrn.com),
and given a more practical focus in {Nottage and Wolff 2000-5}. This paper also
generally limits its literature references to works not cited in the former two
publications, or in {Nottage 2005b}. There has been relatively fewer changes to
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culminating in the enactment of a consolidated “Companies Act”
in 2005. The aims of this “modernisation” project, particularly
over 2001-5, have been described as (i) securing better corporate
governance; (ii) bringing the law into line with a highly-developed
information society; (iii) liberalising fundraising measures; (iv)
bringing corporate law into line with the internationalization of
corporate activity; and (v) modernizing terms and consolidating
corporate law {Takahashi and Shimizu 2005: 36}. More generally,
the reforms since 1993 include “substantial changes in board
governance and incentive structures, major developments in the
areas of directorial duties and personal liability, and expansions of
organizational flexibility”. This has been accompanied by Japanese
corporate law norms with distinct parallels to Delaware law,
especially regarding the use of defensive measures like “poison
pills” in Japan’s brave new world of occasional hostile takeovers
{Milhaupt 2005a: 2175}. Because this package of reforms has
relaxed many mandatory rules set out in Japan’s Commercial
Code, originally enacted in 1899 based primarily on German law
{Baum and Takahashi 2005}, another growing perception is that
Japanese corporate law and practice is or will soon be converging
strongly on the US model {cf Nottage and Wolff 2005}.
Nonetheless, assessments remain divided as to whether these
moves in corporate governance and capitalism more generally in
Japan amount to a new paradigm or “regime shift” {Pempel 1998}.
Part I of this paper introduces and critically assesses often
influential commentary primarily in English on contemporary
Japanese developments.3 It identifies two pairs of views, stressing

securities regulation in Japan, but those have also been considerable {Kelemen
and Sibbitt 2002}.
3
This paper only touches on the literature in Japanese. One reason is that it is
even vaster. It is also less likely to be accessible to most readers, and hence in
need of an interpretive framework like that proposed here for the literature in
English. In addition, the “world” of writings in Japanese, particularly in
academic circles and even in the relatively new field of corporate governance,
tends to focus somewhat more on black-letter law than how that is embedded
in socio-economic context. This disjunction, also somewhat evident also in the
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respectively continuity and change, and argues that the perception
of significant but “gradual transformation” – common also in
other advanced political economies {Streeck and Thelen eds 2005}
– is most plausible. This conclusion requires those who invoke
Japan as still exemplifying a strong stakeholder model to concede
that it continues to morph towards a more Anglo-American
model; but it also identifies a resilient alternative to the latter, and
thus contradicts “strong convergence” theorists (see also generally
{Hill 2005}, reviewing {Gordon and Roe eds 2004}). More generally,
Part II sets out five ways forward through the burgeoning literature
and source material on corporate governance in Japan.4 When
assessing change versus continuity, great care must be taken in: (i)
selecting timeframes, (ii) selecting countries to compare, (iii)
balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic context, (iv)
reflecting on and disclosing normative preferences, and (v) giving
weight to processes as well as outcomes. These lessons can also be
extended to broader comparative corporate governance research,
which may be settling into somewhat of a rut (cf generally {Denis
and McConnell 2005}; {Pinto 2005}). Part III of the paper reviews
these conclusions and ends with a call for further research
particularly on law- and policy-producing processes, rather than
just outcomes. It also sketches how such lessons may be useful in
comparing Japanese developments in the overlapping but even
broader field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Overall,
therefore, this paper aims both to offer a roadmap through the
burgeoning literature on corporate governance and capitalism
more generally in Japan; but also to engage with and contribute to
ongoing theory-building in broader comparative studies in these
fields, emerging from a variety of disciplines – particularly law,
economics, politics, and sociology.

literature in German (see eg {Dernauer 2005}), may lead to somewhat different
assessments of continuity versus change ({Ginsburg et al 2001}), as suggested in
Part II(iii) below.
4
A rich data source on unfolding events in Japan is the monthly e-mail bulletin
freely available via
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/content/anjel_research_guide.htm.
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I. CHANGE IN JAPANESE SOCIETY, LAW AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TWO TIMES TWO
VIEWS
The first set of views shares a perception of no or minimal change
in Japan, but each view differs on the immutable nature of its
socio-economic ordering and legal system. The second set, by
contrast, acknowledges significant change; but one view argues
that a radical shift is evident or underway, whereas another
perceives a more gradual transformation.

(I) NO

OR MINIMAL CHANGE:

(A)

STILL COMMUNITARIAN

SOCIETY & STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE

At one extreme, John Haley {2005a; 2005b} insists that nothing is
new in the (North) East, in that the corporate sector – like the
public sector5 – continues to give primacy to entry-level hiring
coupled with a central personnel office staffed by senior career
managers charged with recruitment, training, assignment and
promotion of career staff. In his view, this underpins a broader
stakeholder approach to corporate governance, and fits with
Japan’s ongoing communitarian approach to law and society
{Haley 1998}.
Ronald {Dore 2000} has become more circumspect, conceding that
“employee sovereignty has shifted markedly towards shareholder
sovereignty”, and identifying as another related pressure point
“the development of a market for corporate control” {Dore 2005:
443}. But he too emphasizes that employment institutions

5

Cf eg {Amyx 2004}, noting mid-career hires of specialists into the Financial
Supervisory Agency set up in 1998 (“FSA”, expanded into the Financial Services
Agency in 2000), as the centerpiece of a novel regime for financial markets
regulation following turmoil in financial markets particularly from late 1997;
and of mid-career transfers and hires of specialists into the Cabinet Office,
increasingly powerful since its inauguration in 2001.
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affecting the careers of top managers, in particular, have still
changed little in Japan, even compared to Germany. This helps to
insulate Japan’s traditional means of motivating both honest and
dynamic corporate managers, despite the fading ideology
encouraging trust-based relationships that had more directly
underpinned such institutions.6
Sanford {Jacoby 2005: 11-12}, similarly drawing primarily on
empirical research from around 2001, also concludes that a core
aspect of corporate governance has not changed much since
around 1980, at least for listed companies and compared to the US.
He argues that Japanese companies remain relatively organizationoriented, focused on long-term employees and broader
stakeholders in their corporate governance, underscored by a highstatus centralised Human Relations (HR) department. Compared
to Haley (who implies that the distribution of Japanese firms in
2004, “Japan 2004” in Figure 1 below, remains virtually identical
to that in 1980), Jacoby concedes some shifts toward more marketoriented firms, with HR executives losing some influence.
However, he views the US as having moved even more strongly
towards that extreme (from “US 1980” to “US 2004”) over the last
two decades.
Figure 1 (adapted from {Jacoby 2005: 158})

6

Thus, the neo-communitarian hermeneutical approach to Japanese law and
society presented by {Tanase, 2005; forthcoming} has rather more in common
with Dore.
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Although Jacoby’s study purports to be about “corporate
governance”, he focuses overwhelmingly on “employment
relations”. Admittedly, especially in the Japanese context, the
relations between managers and employees are very important for
the governance of firms. But so too are other relations that he
hardly touches on, particularly between the firms and their
creditors or suppliers. Nonetheless, Figure 1 can be thought also as
illustrating only a limited shift in Japan (“x”) away from a broader
stakeholder-based approach to corporate governance overall and
towards a more shareholder-based approach, which moreover has
gained even more traction in the US over the last quarter century
(“x + •”).

(I) NO CHANGE: (B) ACTUALLY RATIONALLY SELF-INTERESTED,
HENCE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

In partial contrast, Mark Ramseyer agrees that little has really
changed in Japan, but only because everyone else has
fundamentally misconstrued the true nature of its law and society.
Rather than a communitarian orientation and broader stakeholder
primacy, he asserts, the Japanese have always been driven by
narrow (mostly financial) rational self-interest {Ramseyer and
Nakazoto 1999}. This is reflected in more indirect but significant
returns to shareholders even during the high-growth era after
World War II, when “lifelong employment” practices spread
among larger Japanese companies {Kaplan and Ramseyer 1996}. On
this view, observed shifts towards greater shareholder primacy in
recent years are merely a move “back to the future” of corporate
law in Japan ({Miwa and Ramseyer 2005a}; cf also {Okazaki 2004}).
Consistently, moreover, he and his main co-author insist that the
“main banks” commonly perceived as having emerged as another
substitute monitor of managerial performance were a figment of
the (mainly Marxist) imagination {Miwa & Ramseyer 2005b}.

8
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Thus, reports of their steady demise recently are wrong; they never
existed.7 Ramseyer has not (yet) been bold enough to say that
lifelong employment is also a pure fiction, but presumably he
would decry this as a practice forced upon managers by a
misguided legal system.
To visualize this understanding, think again of Figure 1 above as
more generally depicting a spectrum of stakeholder versus
shareholder corporate governance, as well as organization- versus
market-oriented HR practices. Then, for Ramseyer, the two bell
curves in Figure 1 above representing the distribution of Japanese
firms in 1980 and 2004 (“Japan 1980” and “Japan 2004”) may
simply vanish, becoming their US counterparts (“US 1980” and
“US 2004”)! Alternatively, at least, the curves need to be redrawn
similarly towards the market end of the spectrum.

(II) CHANGE: (A)

DRAMATIC

SHIFTS

TOWARDS

MARKET

SOLUTIONS AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

A major contrast lies with those who instead perceive significant
shifts occurring in Japan, away from a stakeholder approach to
corporate governance giving primacy especially to core employees
and instead giving primacy to shareholder interests. Again there

7

Cf eg {Milhaupt 2002}, summarised in {Nottage 2005b} with other literature
contrary to Ramseyer’s assertions. For more empirical evidence of the post-War
importance of main banks, see also eg {Amyx 2004} (demonstrating their
compatibility with informal regulation by the Ministry of Finance until the
establishment of the FSA in 1998: agreeing on the latter, see also {Cerny 2005});
and especially {Gerlach and Lincoln 2004} (using qualitative and quantitative
analysis in chapter 3, and regression analysis in chapter 4, to demonstrate the
partial persistence of main bank-centred “horizontal keiretsu”, as well as
manufacturing or distribution “vertical keiretsu”). For a sociological (rather
than political science or economic) theory of Japan’s banking networks,
including an explanation for institutional and structural properties leading to
superior bank performance when the economy was growing but poor
performance as it has declined, see the social exchange model in {Wan et al
2005}.
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are two variants. One view emphasises dramatic change,
epitomized by the editor of The Economist in a recent comment
on the appointment of a Welshman to head Sony, but also shared
by many writers in the (especially Western) financial press:8
“Think of all the features that, 10, 15 or 20 years ago,
were considered axiomatic about big Japanese
companies. They had extensive cross-shareholdings
with other firms, especially suppliers and banks. They
used the promise of lifetime employment to keep their
labor force loyal, paying according to age and seniority.
They had strangely large corporate boards, stuffed with
grandees and retired executives. They worried about
sales and market share, not profits. Their top
executives all came from within, and behaved more
like bureaucrats taking their turn in the top seats for a
few years than like corporate chieftains. The idea of
foreigners on the board, let alone in senior
management, was anathema.
Such generalizations were always a bit overdone, but
not by much. Now, you can cross out every single one
of them. Cross-shareholdings have largely been
unwound. Lifetime employment, even in big firms, is
now the exception not the rule thanks to changes in
labor laws that have allowed workers to be employed
on short-term contracts. Such employees make up
40% or more of the total at manufacturers such as
Toyota. Many -- though not all -- corporate boards
have been streamlined, with more independent
directors and fewer placemen. The profitability of big
Japanese firms has risen to record levels (when
measured as a ratio to sales), thanks to restructuring,

8

{Emmott 2005}. See also {Dawson and Tashiro 2005}. Emphasising the decline
of cross-shareholding since the late 1990s, but hardly its complete “unwinding”,
see also {Okabe 2002}.
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the aforementioned labor-force changes, and efforts to
fatten margins. Falling wages leave Japan's domestic
economy still suffering from deflation and weak
demand, but do wonders for corporate profits.
Executives remain primarily bureaucratic but there are
now many more exceptions, sounding and behaving
more like American CEOs and with senior
management pay geared to performance. And foreign
executives are no longer unacceptable.”
Likewise, The Economist saw the victory of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in the snap election it called on
(symbolically) 11 September 2005, to renew overwhelmingly its
mandate for deregulation of the postal savings system, as an
important further step towards restoring Japan as “a normal
advanced economy”, as well as an indicator of “just how much the
electorate has changed, and matured, over the course of Japan's
dismal decade”.9
Similar views, of Japan and its corporate world well on the road to
Americanisation, are also popular among other writers in the
financial press.10 Again, it may be helpful to conceptualise such
conclusions in terms of Figure 1. Even in employment relations,
for example, The Economist would perceive a sharper shift by
Japan towards the market end of the spectrum in recent years.
Broadening the scope of corporate governance to encompass other
relationships such as those between firms and their financial
institutions, more clearly reconfigured after financial markets

9

{Economist, 2005 #139}. But see the Leader in the same issue, concluding that
the LDP’s moderate reformism belies “a new Japan”: {Economist, 2005 #139}.
10
See also eg {Tett 2004}. Apart from the obvious point that proclaiming
“change” will tend to sell more copy than “continuity”, this tendency in the
financial press may be linked to broader shifts in the media world that have
underpinned perceptions of crises and hence hence widespread changes in both
government regulation and tort litigation in countries like the US {Haltom and
McCann 2004}.
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crises and deregulation in the late 1990s, The Economist would
argue for an even sharper shift towards more shareholder-driven
corporate governance in Japan.

(II) CHANGE: (B)

SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS AWAY FROM THE

STAKEHOLDER MODEL

The second variant of the perspective acknowledging more change,
well underway in Japanese corporate governance and society, is
more guarded. My own analyses so far have acknowledged a
significant realignment of stakeholders, with shareholders winning
out clearly over creditors,11 but less so vis-à-vis employees
(despite much more change underway than acknowledged by
Haley12), and perhaps even less so in some areas of industrial
organization (especially in relations with key suppliers) and
relations between firms and regulators or the broader community
(such as NGOs):

11

For further instances of growing shareholder influence, not otherwise cited in
this presentation, see eg {, 2005 #12}, {Hutton, 2005 #62}, {Jopson, 2004 #86},
{Sanchanta, 2005 #74;Sapsford, 2005 #77}.
12
Particularly on core incumbents in larger firms, see also {Jacoby, 2005
#95;Jacoby, 2005 #73;Jacoby, 2005 #72} and (albeit generally with less change
compared even to Germany) {Jackson 2005; Jackson and Moerke 2005}. But the
proportion of non-regular employees has been rising disturbingly, from 20 to 30
percent over the last decade, despite rising unemployment and recession, and
Japan faces the broader challenge of a rapidly graying population {Seike 2005}.
The country also has an ever-increasing “lost generation” of young people who
cannot and/or do not want to participate in the regular workforce based on the
model extolled by Haley: see {Mathews, 2004 #167}, {Saito, 2005 #21} and
{Kondo, 2005 #20}.
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Figure 2 (from {Nottage & Wolff 2005})

Relative stasis in the latter dimensions represents more than
institutional inertia, and a multi-layered outcome {Sarra and
Nakahigashi 2002} that poses problems for overly monolithic
views of divergent “varieties of capitalism” ({Nottage 2001; cf
{Hall & Soskice 2001} and {Goodin 2003}}. It also means the
continued existence of a competing ideological model for (re)organizing corporate governance, allowing more trust-building
“learning by monitoring” that may yet resonate in areas such as
shareholder relations where the emerging ideology instead mostly
assumes a “trust-defying” homo economicus.13

13

Cf eg {Learmount 2002}, contrasting “economic” theories of the firm
assuming strongly self-interested human behaviour and “organizational”
theories allowing for more other-oriented behaviour; but concluding from
detailed qualitative studies that corporate governance relationships for Japanese
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Likewise, {Lincoln and Gerlach 2004: 373} confirm that a new
economy is emerging in Japan, differing from the old in significant
ways. In their network analysis terms:
“it is characterized by weaker, less concatenated, less
expansive, less multiplex and less embedded ties; more
fleeting fragmented, asymmetric and numerous ties.
The proposed reforms in Japanese corporate boards
illustrate [as enacted in 2002 and in force since 2003
(see Appendix A), discussed below in relation to
{Gilson and Milhaupt 2005}]. A board with a larger
percentage of bona fide outsiders means more links
between the firm and its environment but, absent the
power of keiretsu to mold them, such ties will be less
overlapping, interwoven and otherwise ordered than in
the past. Although our data [primarily from the 1960s
through to the 1990s] show it proceeding in fits and
starts depending on the period and the group, the slow
and uneven dissolution of the keiretsu is an
inescapable macro-trend. In their stead is materializing
a looser, more flexibly structured amalgam of micronetwork pairings and clusterings pegged closely to the
strategic business goals of individual firms. However,
much of the basis for the networks of the past persists:

firms overall – not just relationships with employees or senior managers, and
even while changing somewhat – still fit better the latter theories. (He does not
examine relationships with key suppliers, which retain elements of both
economic and organizational theories.) Thus, his general perception tends more
towards those of Dore and Jacoby. Albeit without addressing ideological
underpinnings or implications, {Hasegawa 2005: 216-7} adopts a similar view.
He concludes that the 1990s led only to “redefined internal” employee
corporate governance, rationalizing board membership in a lower growth era,
rather than “external” governance (involving more market-oriented
mechanisms, for the benefit primarily of shareholders). More generally, drawing
on studies from social psychology research into trust-based behaviour, see eg
{Blair and Stout 2001} and related studies by them and others, reviewed in {Du
Plessis et al 2005: 374-81}.

14
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companies still make strategic and symbolic
investments in one another and favor long-term, hightrust partnerships over short-term arm’s-length ties”.
More specifically, {Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005} find that rising
foreign ownership of listed Japanese companies over 1991-2000 led
to significant downsizing even of permanent employees as well as
asset divestitures, associated with a shift towards shareholderoriented corporate governance. However, the effects were less in
firms more deeply embedded in the Japanese stakeholder system,
namely with high levels of ownership by domestic financial
institutions or close ties with other firms. {Ahmadjian and
Robbins 2005: 467-8} then speculate that “restructuring among
foreign-owned firms may remove the perceived illegitimacy of
these practices and encourage their spread to larger, older and
more prestigious firms”, while conceding the alternative
possibility of banks and business groups continuing “to check
foreign influence, leading to an increased bifurcation between
firms exposed to foreign capital that adopt Anglo-American
practices and those that remain tied to the Japanese system and
maintain business as usual”. Quite consistently, {Abe and
Shimizutani 2005} find that the rising numbers of outside directors
in Japanese firms are more inclined to implement layoffs and
voluntary or early retirement, while insiders are more likely to
decrease new hiring and protect incumbent employees.
Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, prolific commentators on
corporate governance transformations in Japan, generally conclude
that even more significant shifts are already underway in Japan.
Most of their work, conveniently brought together in a recent
collection of their essays {Milhaupt and West 2004}, has focused
on how Japanese economic and political actors have reacted quite
rationally and predictably to the evolving formal (legal) and
informal (other institutional) “rules of the game”. Thus, derivative
suits against directors by shareholders to safeguard their interests
were prohibitively expensive and therefore almost unheard of,
until the filing fee was dropped to a small set amount by reform to
the Commercial Code in 1993 (originally {West 1994; 2001b}). The
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regime also had to be reconfigured in an attempt to develop a new
market for venture capital {Milhaupt 1997}. Such shifts towards
more shareholder-focused corporate governance were necessitated
by the breakdown in Japan’s “convoy” system of banking and
finance, whereby financial institutions moved at the speed of the
slowest member supported by the implicit guarantee of
government bailouts, beginning with the housing mortgage
debacle over the first half of the 1990s {Milhaupt and Miller 1997};
and crowned by the full-blown banking crisis of 1998 (see also
{Milhaupt 1999}). Before such transformations, shareholders
needed to turn to organized crime syndicates to partially secure
their investments {West 1999; Milhaupt and West 2000}. Now,
with new rules of the game leading also to a slowly growing
market for Mergers & Acquisitions ({Milhaupt and West 2003a};
see also {Milhaupt 2005a}), even the new generation of Japan’s elite
– graduates of Tokyo University Law Faculty – are forsaking longterm careers in key ministries in favour of rapidly expanding and
increasingly specialized Tokyo law firms ({Milhaupt and West
2003b}). Overall, they suggest that these studies indicate a shift
from more informal to more formal rules or institutions.
However, this side of the equation – why and how the rules of the
game change, thus influencing new patterns of observed behaviour
– remains less closely examined. Although {Milhaupt and West
2004} acknowledge their debt to this prominent political
economist, this collection of their works does not pursue the
conceptualisation of rules or institutions as “endogenous rules of
the game” advanced by {Aoki 2001}. On that view, institutions
both arise from the interaction and stable expectations of socioeconomic actors (being a dependent variable at time t), but also
guide and constrain actor behaviour (becoming an independent
variable at time t + 1) {Amyx 2004: 27}. Recent work by political
economists comparing key components of Japanese corporate
governance has also been sensitive to such feedback loops, even
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though it further complicates especially the quantitative analysis
of causal patterns in historical development.14
Writing on his own {Milhaupt 2001} has emphasized the role of
“norm entrepreneurs”, eg in breaking an (informal) taboo against
hostile takeovers under the new (legal and social) rules of the
games, and the activities of such actors have certainly attracted
growing attention in more recent years.15 Yet he has only just
started to look at drivers of these new rules, especially the more
formal (legal) ones that have been more prominent than the
informal ones, but which (on their book’s preliminary analysis)
should tend to become more significant. For example, {Kanda and
Milhaupt 2003} first point out that the director’s duty of loyalty
transplanted into the Commercial Code (Art 254-3) from the US in
1950 only became operational from the late 1980s. They then
explain the initial stasis by the existence of partial substitutes (Art
254(3)’s duty of care), but also a lack of “micro-fit” (few avenues
for derivative suits until 1993, and judges and lawyers capable of
applying broad principles rather than narrow rules16) and weak

14

For example {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 16 and 23} argue that “politics”
such as electoral rules impact on “policies”, such as minority shareholder
protections, which in turn result in shareholder diffusion (a key corporate
governance “outcome”); but also that a “policy generates support for its
continuance by eliminating its opponents and strengthening its beneficiaries
and their commitment to the policy”, creating a feedback loop from outcomes
back to politics. {Thelen 2004: 290-1} is even less deterministic, suggesting in
particular that the German evolution of employment skills system since the
late 19th century shows how institutional complementarities can develop not
just through positive feedback, but by actors actively adapting inherited
institutions to new circumstances, interests or power constellations.
15
See {Milhaupt 2005a}; and also {Economist.Intelligence.Unit, 2005 #168}, full
report at http://www.eiu.com/MA_Japan.
16
The former seems more important than the latter, since Japanese legal
practitioners have had few difficulties developing broad principles in other areas
of law (such as “good faith” in contract law), and a relative aversion to brightline rules is consistent with the orientation of Japanese (and indeed US) law and
legal institutions towards more substantive legal reasoning, at least compared to
the English law tradition ({Nottage 2002}).
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“macro-fit” (private substitutes, such as crime syndicates, and
lifetime employment practices in a high growth economy).
Presumably, such factors should work towards the enactment of
new rules, not just the sudden operationalisation of dormant “law
in books”. Instead, {Milhaupt 2003} indicates that a major
determinant of corporate law changes over the last decade has
been the growing power of Japan’s managers and their lobbyists,
since so many are enabling rules providing extra flexibility (see
also Appendix A17). Such provisions can be used for the benefit of
shareholders and the company as a whole, but also to insulate
managers themselves (as we now know so well in the aftermath of
Enron and its parallels in Australia: {Clarke, 2003 #105}).
That view means acknowledging also that the politics of corporate
law reform may be very context-specific, which is one lesson I
draw from his most recent work on the effects of the “elective”
corporate governance reforms enacted in 2002. His main focus is
on how and why a small but significant number of listed large
companies have elected to replace the German-inspired regime of
statutory auditors monitoring the board of directors, in turn
potentially monitoring managers in the interests of shareholders
(but also possibly other stakeholders), with a “US-style” regime of
Committees of (mostly outside) directors charged with
Nomination, Compensation and Audit of directors. {Gilson and
Milhaupt 2005} find a variety of firms and reasons for adopting this
new alternative, ranging from signaling “good governance”
(especially if major firms with significant foreign ownership, like
Sony18) to, conversely, using the narrow definition -- so far19 -- of
“outside” director to plant parent or sibling company directors on

17

This updates {Fujita 2004}, drawing also on {Takahashi and Shimizu 2005} and
{Dernauer 2005}. On earlier legislation, see Tatsuta 2005} and especially {Baum
and Takahashi 2005}.
18
See also generally {Ahmadjian 2005}.
19
Cf already the tighter definition, requiring in fact “independence” and thus
excluding parent company directors, expected even by Japan’s Pension Fund
Association: {Seki 2005}.
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the new Committees in order to increase control of a corporate
group (like Hitachi – with clear parallels with orthodox German,
rather than Anglo-American, corporate practice). Interestingly,
however, {Milhaupt 2005b} links this hybrid outcome to the lack
of clear vision by policy-makers as to which of the two options
was preferred, in turn due to a contest between the Ministry of
Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The former
initially proposed simply one, Committee-based corporate
governance model; but the latter supposedly objected on behalf of
the business community. Main reasons given by MoF were
problems in securing requisite independent directors, and
expecting them to operate in still highly relational networks. But
another reason, reportedly, was the objection to imposing one
corporate governance form on diverse organizations. Actually, this
objection was echoed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI: {Ahmadjian 2003}). Since the latter is even more
closely linked to business sector lobby groups, the “success” in
allowing two options in the 2002 Code amendments seems to
reinforce the hypothesis of Milhaupt {2003} about their growing
political clout in corporate law reforms. On the other hand, it is
very intriguing – and a departure from the old ways of reforming
corporate law until the 1990s – that so many new players are
involved in this policy-making process. The MoJ (traditionally
charged with commercial law reform) now competes with METI
(responsible for broader industrial policy) and MoF (bolstered by its
jurisdiction over stock exchanges, which in other countries set
such “elective” standards – often more strongly: see eg {Collett
and Hrasky 2005}). In the background, but surfacing sometimes in
the reform councils (shingikai) or committees in each of the
ministries, or promoting a growing number of law reforms through
private members’ bills, we find the pro-business LDP
Subcommittee on Commercial Law {Fujita 2004} and the
Keidanren ({Vogel 2005: 160}; see generally also {Kitagawa &
Nottage 2005}). The battles, moreover, are fought out in the
context of much greater media interest in corporate affairs and
policy reform.
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In another recent study, into the evolving regulatory regime for
hostile takeovers in Japan, {Milhaupt 2005a} highlights a new
player in generating the new rules of the game: the courts. In
Nippon Hoso KK v Livedoor KK (23 March 2005), the Tokyo High
Court affirmed the trial court’s injunction preventing the target
broadcaster issuing warrants to thwart a hostile takeover by an
internet provider led by a flamboyant young businessman and
“norm entrepreneur”, Takafumi Horie. The High Court clearly
drew on the Delaware courts’ approach developed in the Unocal
case, focusing on the threat of target shareholder exploitation and
the proportionality of the response by the target’s management. A
“Corporate Value Study Group” set up by METI in August 2004
then rushed to complete “Guidelines for Hostile Takeover
Defensive Measures (Corporate Value Protection Measures”,
jointly issued with the MoJ in May 2005 based on the Study’s
Group report that drew even more heavily on Delaware law. On 1
June 2005, expressly referring to the Guidelines, the Tokyo
District Court allowed a foreign institutional investor’s challenge
to Japan’s first “poison pill”. The Delaware model has thus
provided a compromise “global standard”, more shareholderoriented than the 2002 German Takeover Code implicitly rejected
by the Study Group, but less so than the UK’s City Code requiring
target firm boards to remain strictly neutral and obtain
shareholder approval before installing defensive measures. Yet,
rather than outright Americanisation of Japanese law, {Milhaupt
2005a: 2210-1} suggests that “the High Court’s decision could be
the foundation for development of a Unocal rule with Japanese
characteristics – preventing egregious entrenchment attempts by
incumbent management, but sanctioning airtight defenses to
protect a range of corporate interests that appear very broad from a
U.S. perspective”.
Indeed, the outcome in the Livedoor case in 2004, and that in the
District Court case in 2005, suggest that Japanese courts are quite
finely attuned to the “gradual transformation” of Japanese
corporate governance towards a more shareholder-oriented – yet
still stakeholder – model. If that transformation proceeds fairly
clearly, we may expect further decisions along these lines, perhaps
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impacting back on legislative reform in this area or related fields of
corporate law. Japanese courts have seen an upsurge in corporate
law cases of many kinds since the 1990s (see eg {Takahashi and
Sakamoto 2004}; {NichibenrenHomukenkyuZaidan ed 2004}),
creating more scope for further iterations of judicial innovation
and legislative reform, as witnessed for example in the field of
product liability over the last decade.20 Broader comparative
analogies could be made with new interactions between the two
spheres in contemporary corporate governance in Australia
{Corbett and Bottomley 2004}, and even more elaborate processes
of “reflexive harmonisation” in member states of the European
Union adjusting their domestic takeover regimes in the shadow of
a Directive finally enacted in 2004 {Zumbansen 2004}.
Overall, this new direction in Milhaupt’s work, starting to address
why and how (especially formal) legal rules are created rather than
just their impact on corporate behaviour, seems to go against
recent work by West. He argues that Japan’s corporate law
reforms, even since the 1990s, are driven by accelerating
“exogenous” shocks such as scandals and (increasingly) foreign
competition and economic downturn. {West 2001} contrasts this
with “endogenous” change, led by rent-seeking actors (notably
lawyers and other lobbyists in the US, with more scope for action
given jurisdictional competition between Delaware and other
states interested in attracting incorporations through corporate
law reforms). In Japan recently, however, accounts by Milhaupt
and others instead indicate growing “endogenous” competition –
and perhaps even more broadly reasoned dialogue – among a
growing array of state and even non-state actors.21 West’s more

20

In its judgment in early 1994 in the “exploding TV” case, the Osaka District
Court pushed the legislature towards adding that year a strict liability cause of
action for defective products {Nottage 2004}, and that legislation in turn seems
to have been taken as a cue to issue pro-plaintiff judgments particularly since
the late 1990s {Nottage 2005}, amidst renewed widespread concern for product
safety.
21
It remains true that even Japan’s rapidly growing commercial law firms,
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recent work with {Pistor et al 2003a; 2003b} may be more
suggestive especially for the current and foreseeable rounds of
corporate law reform in Japan. In particular, it does seem likely
that the more enabling Japanese corporate law continues to
become, the more legal innovation will take place, and the greater
the need will become for institutional innovation, including new
law enforcement agents. Even under that model, however, the
hybrid development under the 2002 reform makes it more
doubtful that Japan, as a (perhaps unusually developed) “legal
transplant country”, will continue to reveal less innovative
capacity as measured by the authors’ rate of legal change in
corporate law and finance.

(III) “THE GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION”:
CONTINUITY, IN JAPAN AND BEYOND

BEYOND

How should we assess then these very different answers to the
question of whether there has been significant change in Japan and
its corporate governance system, namely: (i) No, because Japan
remains (a) communitarian or instead (b) individualistic in basic
orientation, or (ii) Yes, (a) to a very large extent or (b) to a
considerably lesser extent. In particular, can we see already or
expect soon the “Americanisation of Japanese law”, or at least
important parts such as securities regulation, driven more broadly
by economic liberalization, political fragmentation, and
concomitant rise in the markets for legal services {Kelemen and
Sibbitt 2002}? Readers should really be the judges, checking these
commentators’ selections of topics, their sources and data, and
other material, including if possible the much vaster literature in
Japanese.

{Nagashima and Zaloom 2002} and the new fully profit-sharing
Japanese/international law firm partnerships, do not seem to be getting into this
new policy-making game; but perhaps that remains a unique feature of US law
and society anyway.
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Nonetheless, the conclusion of myself and others that significant
but not overwhelming change is underway in Japan –
interpretation (ii)(a) – draws support from a broader recent study
entitled “Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced
Political Economies”. Drawing on empirical studies in Japan,
Germany, France, Hungary, the UK and the US, the editors argue
that “[1] equating instrumental with adaptive and reproductive
minor change, and [2] major change with mostly exogenous
disruption of continuity, makes excessively high demands on [3]
‘real’ change to be recognised as such, and tends to reduce most or
all observable changes to adjustment for the purpose of stability”
{Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8}. They are impatient with theories of
path dependence that tend either, as in work on “varieties of
capitalism” {Hall and Soskice 2001} and welfare state
retrenchment {Pierson 1994}, to imply [1] “reproduction by
adaptation”, or – more rarely – [2] punctuated equilibria or
“breakdown and replacement” {Pempel 1998: 3}. Streek and
Thelen argue compellingly that theorists have not sufficiently
recognised and conceptualized [3] “gradual transformation”, the
now much more widely observed combination of incremental
change resulting in discontinuity:
Table 1 (adapted from {Streek and Thelen 2005: 9})

Result of Change

Process of
Change

Continuity

Discontinuity

Incremental

[1] Reproduction
by adaptation

[3] Gradual
transformation

Abrupt

Survival and
return

[2] Breakdown and
replacement
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In my matrix of commentators on Japanese corporate governance,
“continuity” advocates like Haley, Jacoby and Dore fall into
category [1]. Strong proponents of change like The Economist fall
into category [2]. Those in category [3], perceiving incremental
change that nonetheless adds up to a significant transformation in
Japanese corporate governance and society generally, include
myself, Milhaupt and West, Vogel {2005}, and a growing majority
of researchers.22
In addition, all five modes for gradual but nonetheless
transformative change, newly conceptualised by {Streeck and
Thelen: 19-30} from their cross-national study of liberalising
advanced political economies, resonate with shifts in Japan since
the 1990s:
(1) “Displacement”, as subordinate institutions (and
related norms) slowly become more salient, can be
seen in the fevered attempts by Ramseyer to prove
that Japan maintained strong market-driven forms of
socio-economic ordering even after World War II.
Without accepting that these were the only forms, we
can and should concede that some may have existed
but were consciously or unconsciously downplayed.
On the other hand, they still struggle to displace other
forms of socio-economic ordering, evident in the
“learning by monitoring” mechanisms still at work in
some areas of the automobile industry ({Nottage and
Wolff 2005}; see also {Ahmadjian 2005}).
(2) “Layering”, whereby new elements are added onto
existing institutions gradually change the status and
structure of the latter, can be seen in many areas. A

22

On broader changes in Japanese society, see another – aptly named – recent
study: {Kingston 2004}. The term “gradual transformation” seems to be adapted
from the earlier “Great Transformation” towards liberalized markets analysed
by Karl {Polanyi 1944}, who pointed out also how their more destructive effects
could be constrained even in modern society {Streeck and Thelen 2005: 4}.
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clear example is the superimposition of the Product
Liability Law of 1994 onto the venerable Civil Code
{Nottage 2004}. Adding post-graduate “law school”
programs from 2004, as part of a raft of reforms aimed
at improving civil justice for firms as well as
individual citizens, also hopes to have a trickle-down
effect on undergraduate legal education.23 Other
examples more closely related to corporate governance
include Japan’s banks already differentiating more
among corporate clients {Vogel 2005}, and the small
but significant uptake already of the optional
“Committee”-style board system analysed by {Gilson
and Milhaupt 2005}.
(3) An instance of “Drift”, neglecting institutional
maintenance despite external change, may be the
unwillingness – even compared to more liberalized
Australia – to update the regulatory regime for
securing the safety of general consumer goods {Nottage
2005}.
(4) {Vogel 2005} also reveals significant “Conversion”
both through redeploying old institutions to new
purposes (as METI adopts the mantle of more liberal
reformers within government: {Elder 2003}), and
through new purposes being attached to old structures
(like venture capital being incubated within corporate
group subsidiaries).
(5) Finally the gradual attrition of core regular employees
may be seen as “Exhaustion”, involving institutions
gradually withering away over time.
In short, Japan is largely following other complex industrialised
democracies in “re-regulating” as it “de-regulates” {Nottage

23

I concur with the assessment by {Haley 2005a} that this initiative is unlikely
to have much short-term impact. However, even here I concede some bright
side, and hope that this first round of reforms can be built on to generate more
thorough-going “conservative reformism” {Nottage 2006b}.
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2005b}, albeit probably with a different mix of the main modes for
achieving such incremental but transformative change, and overall
with less liberalisation than perhaps Germany and certainly
France ({Goyer 2006}; but cf {O’Sullivan 2005}).

II. FIVE WAYS FORWARD: PARTICULARLY, PROCESS
PERTURBATIONS?
Even more broadly, five caveats may be helpful in deciding
whether this interim assessment is more persuasive than the other
views categorised above. These points, drawing partly on similar
issues arising in other comparative studies, may also be useful in
carrying out or interpreting studies of corporate governance
beyond Japan. Specifically, great care must be taken – and justified
– in: (i) selecting timeframes, (ii) selecting countries to compare,
(iii) balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic
context, (iv) reflecting on and disclosing normative preferences,
and (v) giving weight to processes as well as outcomes, particularly
when assessing change versus continuity.

(I) TIMING
First, history matters in many ways. Analyses often seem to be
influenced by when they happen to be carried out or published, for
example, influenced especially by the current economic
performance of the analyst’s home jurisdiction and/or those
compared, often linked to whether they are seen as having “good”
governance or not {Aronson 2005}. In 2001, for example, after the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 followed by unprecedented failure of
banks and securities houses in Japan, and before the massive
collapses of Enron and other firms in the US, there was a clearer
tendency to see Japanese corporate governance as bad and US
governance as good. This was the context, for example, for the
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theory of strong convergence on the shareholder-driven model
advanced by {Hansmann and Kraakman 2001}.24 By contrast, from
2002 onwards, Enron and its aftermath led to skepticism about the
benefits of the US approach, and hence more tendencies to
perceive and acclaim ongoing divergences, in Japan and elsewhere.
On the other hand, perhaps especially as new theories are deployed
to explain rapidly evolving realties, several studies along such
lines have drawn on rather outdated data.25
Even if these challenges can be acknowledged and minimized,
further problems arise in selecting time spans for comparisons.
More objectively, for example, aspects of US corporate governance
have themselves changed considerably after 2002. In particular,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has allowed federal securities regulators to
go beyond (most market-oriented) disclosure requirements, and
impinge on traditionally state-based corporate law by imposing
obligations as to board composition and other matters internal to
the corporation {Cioffi 2005}. Thus, Figure 1 above (extended from
HR practices to corporate governance regimes more generally)
should probably have looked rather different if the comparison had
run only through to around 2000. The bell curve for the US would
have been even further (right) towards the market end of the
spectrum than “US 2004”, perhaps exacerbating a growing
divergence between the US and Japan even as the latter also moves
more slowly in that direction. Alternatively, more divergence may
again have to be depicted in a few years from now, if {Du Plessis et
al 2006} correctly predict a reaction against the Act’s more

24

Such tendencies are related to express or implied normative preferences,
discussed further in Part II(iv) below.
25
Jacoby’s empirical research appears to date back to around 2001. That at least
was the year in which he conducted his mail survey of listed Japanese and US
firms. It is unclear when exactly the interviews of several companies in similar
industry sectors in both countries were carried out. A similar temporal lag is
found in {Learmount 2002: 41}, whose fieldwork on fourteen Japanese firms was
principally “carried out in 1998-99, … with some follow-up visits in 2000”.
Even more strikingly, interviews by {Hasegawa 2005} for his 8 case studies were
conducted in September 1999.
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interventionist approach as a result of finding that it did not
prevent another likely round of corporate collapses
Figure 1 would have looked even more very different if Jacoby
{2005: 84-9} had compared Japan and the US between 1955 and
1980, rather than 1980 and 2004, since even US firms were much
more organization-oriented until the 1970s. As well as fewer
differences in the distribution and means of firms in Japan and the
US over that “Golden Age”, there would have been fewer shifts,
supporting the “strong-path-dependence” hypothesis rather than
the “weak-path-dependence” he tends to find between 1980 and
2004. Even if he had focused instead on the 1980s, he might have
found more evidence of “converging-divergences”, with an
increasing variety of firms in both countries and even a shift of the
means towards each other, as some firms in the US adopted or
adapted some Japanese-style management techniques. Conversely,
{Jacoby 2005: 19-20} would have found less support for the
“national-model” hypothesis, namely only Japan moving –
towards more market-oriented practices.
Even if we focus on recent history, say 1980-2004, this may not
necessarily predict where Japan or the US will head in the next
few decades – or even in the turbulent political times likely to
persist for the next few years in both countries, working their
ways out of different but dangerous economic circumstances. As
{Sacoby 2005: 163-73} concedes, both countries now stand at a
crossroads, although Japan may be under more pressure yet its
institutions less open to normative and political perturbations.
Looking back eventually over a broader historical period, say from
1980-2030, we may well find Japan to have converged somewhat
on the US particularly over the late 1990s, only to diverge further
after 2005 as relative economic performance picked up, even
without any more shifts of the US towards market-oriented
solutions. Thus, we would have to acknowledge considerable
change, but not necessarily consistent convergence (see also
generally {Du Plessis 2004}).
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On the other hand, extending the historical frame of reference has
encouraged bolder commentators to detect and advocate broader
world-wide convergence towards shareholder primacy in corporate
governance {Hansmann and Kraakman 2001} or, more generally, a
modern liberal “horizontal society” {Friedman 1999}. Even {Hall
and Soskice 2001}, proponents of “varieties of capitalism” theory
that otherwise generally predicts ongoing divergences, have
conceded that more “coordinated market economies” like Japan
and Germany remain at risk of a one-way slide towards AngloAmerican “liberal market economies” if and when trust
relationships unravel. However, as mentioned above (Part I (iii)),
outright displacement does not seem to be so straightforward.
More generally, {Tanase forthcoming} contends that the more we
push for modern liberal law and society, the greater the resistance
encountered as inherent contradictions emerge and community
reasserts itself. Yet this begs the question of when such reactions
will begin to set in, which may not be until a country like Japan
has moved towards highly liberalized markets and a considerable
dose of US-style “adversarial legalism” (cf {Kagan 2001}), judging
by the gradual transformations already found in Japan and other
advanced political economies. Thus, even if change does not occur
uniformly, we may need to acknowledge more potential for
convergence as we expand the temporal frame of reference for our
analysis.

(II) COUNTRIES TO COMPARE
Secondly, especially when discussing convergence, we should be
careful about our points of comparison. In particular, it is
generally risky or less productive just to select two, such as Japan
and the US, as this can lead to “an undue emphasis on differences”
{Aronson 2005: 43}. This is a broader problem in all comparative
law research. Adding a third jurisdiction, such as England for
analyses of contract law, can uncover some important similarities
between the two others, compared to this new reference point
{Nottage 2002; 2004}. Adding Germany, common in the
comparative corporate governance debate given its post-War
economic performance followed by the current malaise, instead
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suggests US exceptionalism. But most commentators see
somewhat more of a shift towards the US model, driven partly by
the economic imperatives of EU market liberalization. Germany is
certainly not becoming the US {Cioffi 2005} and, as just
mentioned, some ruptures have appeared in the US model itself
particularly after the Enron debacle securities. Nonetheless, if we
were to add Germany to the spectrum in Figure 1, we would
probably have to interpose similarly shaped bell curves between
the pairs for Japan and the US; and with, moreover, Germany’s
mean shift for 1980-2004 being greater than Japan’s (“x” in Figure
1). That would mean “directional convergence” {Jacoby 2005: 12}
for both Japan and Germany, towards the US model; but less
“pull” on Japan (for example under the “national-model”
hypothesis, if the US doesn’t move), and/or stronger path
dependence (even if it does). This would be an interesting result
because we might fairly say that Japan is converging less, for
example, but also because it may suggest that Germany may
become a (hybridized) “national-model” competing with the US.
The temptation then is to further increase the countries compared.
This has been characteristic of the “second generation” of
comparative corporate governance scholarship, especially by those
favouring economic analysis, after a first generation that simply
investigated key areas of US concern (such as board composition)
in individual countries {Denis and McConnell 2005}. Much
broader cross-national research into corporate governance is also
becoming popular among political scientists (eg {Gourevitch and
Shinn 2005}). As explained in Part II(v) below, however, there is
certainly a risk in all such studies of producing “very broad and
somewhat superficial conclusions, for example on issues such as
the protection of minority investors, without giving any
consideration to the difficult process of adapting foreign law
concepts and corporate governance institutions to fit into one’s
own system” {Aronson 2005: 43}.
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(III) BLACK-LETTER LAW (PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE) VS SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT (CONTINUITIES)
Thirdly, analysts and their audiences must be aware that in
comparative legal studies there is a tendency to find quite
extensive change and hence much (actual or potential)
convergence when focusing on narrower (more formal) “black
letter law”, especially statutory provisions and case law; but to
find little change and instead divergence when looking at law in
broader context {Ginsburg et al 2001; Nottage 2004}. There is no
necessary correlation between these dyads, as shown indeed by the
study by {West 2001} demonstrating how the statutory provisions
added to the Japanese Commercial Code’s from Illinois law during
the Occupation in 1950 have instead diverged from their source.
Nonetheless, as comparative corporate governance research
becomes ever broader in scope, encompassing other areas of (often
still mandatory) business regulation (see eg {Winkler 2004}) or CSR
{Nottage 2006a}, we need to guard against too readily concluding
that regimes overall are – and will remain – fundamentally
divergent and resistant to change. That may be true along some
dimensions, but not along all.

(IV) NORMATIVE PREFERENCES
Fourthly, in trying to become more reflective about how and why
we and others undertake comparative research like this, we need
to be more honest about underlying normative influences
impacting on our empirical observations. Comparative corporate
governance, as a field, emerged only in the 1980s, just as
culturalist approaches started to lose popularity to the economic
analysis of law, initially in the US but more recently in Europe
(and, to a lesser extent, Japan: {Kozuka 2005}). In reaction to the
former’s often more avowed normative slant, as well as now wellknown problems of tautology and difficulties in “proof”, the
economic analysis of corporate governance has tended to stress a
purely empirical agenda. However, just as in other areas of
economics, hidden normative agendas and the power of rhetoric
are readily apparent (see eg {Ferraro, 2005 #172}). Thus, Mark
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Ramseyer is not only saying that Japan has always had a
competitive market economy and concomitant legal system,
populated by narrowly rational economic actors. He is at least
implying that it should have these features, and thus be
thoroughly deregulated if there happen to be any anti-competitive
remnants.26
By contrast, despite some of his own protestations to the contrary,
Haley {2005a} wants Japan to retain its perceived communitarian
core and related broader stakeholder approach to corporate
governance.27 Thus, he both perceives and acclaims instead a
more conventional regulatory paradigm. The Editor of The
Economist, by contrast, wants both to uncover and to complete
the unraveling of those models, in favour of the liberal models of
economic and social ordering persistently trumpeted by his
journal.28 Lastly, authors like myself (and perhaps Milhaupt and
West) like some (more or less longstanding) features of Japanese
law and society – sometimes communitarian, sometimes radically
individualist – and hope that Japan can recombine them in optimal
ways to meet evolving social needs and expectations.29 This
approach tends therefore towards a re-regulatory paradigm. All this
is not to say that we should abandon the search for empirical
groundings for our normative hunches, but only to be explicit

26

See {Nottage 2005b}. This disguised normative agenda – wanting empirical
studies to prove to show that markets always clear, but otherwise to deregulate
to force them to do so – is also very much the approach of the (first-generation)
Chicago school of (law and) economics: {Freedman and Nottage 2006}.
27
Indeed, he wants more such elements in the US: see also {Haley 1999}.
28
See already {Emmott 1991}; and, urging Japan to tow the hawkish American
line nowadays even on foreign policy, {Emmott 2004}.
29
I must concede that this normative inclination may be related to a
fundamental aspect of my identity: being married to a woman from Kyoto.
Unlike Haley, I find it hard to acclaim all aspects of Japanese culture as reflected
in my wife’s behaviour and beliefs; but nor would I want to efface them or
define them out of existence, as Ramseyer or Emmott seem to desire so
fervently for Japan more generally.
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about the latter and how they may frame our empirical inquiries
and conclusions.

(V) PROCESSES, NOT JUST OUTCOMES
Finally, one particularly promising way to do this seems to move
away from analyzing and predicting specific outcomes, and instead
to focus on processes impacting on Japan’s evolving corporate
governance regime. As well as making us rethink how we assess
change versus continuity, concentrating on processes may
encourage the application of a broader range of methodologies to
answer new questions. Studies should involve qualitative research
as well as quantitative methods – not just the regression analyses
that became almost de rigueur in analyses of commercial
regulation over the 1990s, despite grave problems in generating
and accessing suitably fine-grained quantitative data sets in Japan
{Brinton 2004}. Already, we see salutary signs of impatience with
applications of econometrics alone precisely in the field of
comparative corporate governance {West 2002a}, and hence
experiments in combined methods for other socio-legal studies of
Japan {West 2002b}.30
In particular, {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005} develop an attractive
theory amenable to both multi-country quantitative analysis, and
case studies including countries like Japan.31 While

30

See also eg {Upham 2005} (brilliantly pointing out the strengths and
weaknesses of both Ramseyer’s quantitative approach to the vexed issue of
whether and why Japanese judges are truly independent in politically charged
cases, and Haley’s more historical and institutional approach); and {Horiuchi
2005} (combining quantitative and qualitative studies to explain the quite
unusual phenomenon of higher voter turnout in local rather than national
elections in Japan).
31
{Jacoby 2005} also combines both large-scale survey research with case studies
of HR in firms in comparable sectors in Japan and the US; but is less interested
in the process generating new corporate governance norms than in their effects
on firms. {Learmount 2002: 40} favours a “process study”, but in the sense of a
mainly qualitative study of how inputs like board composition flow through to
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acknowledging problems still in determining causation and so on,
their correlations among data sets and some limited regression
analysis indicate the general usefulness of a model involving:
(a) “politics” (an independent variable comprising “preferences”
of different interest groups towards governance regimes,
combined with political “institutions” such as constitutional
frameworks and political parties generating majoritarian versus
compromise approaches); leading to
(b) “policies” (an intervening variable, reflected in “minority
shareholder protections” or MSPs; and “degrees of
coordination”, features of Liberal Market Economies vs
Coordinated Market Economics {Hall and Soskice eds 2001});
which cause
(c) “corporate governance” variations (the dependent variable,
measured by the diffusion of shareholdings).
Especially regarding (a), political preferences, they deduce three
main categories of tensions and predict different corporate
governance outcomes accordingly:

output variables like corporate performance, as opposed to “speculation about
how governance might or should operate, based on inferences from broad
statistics interpreted through different theoretical frameworks”. ({Gaston 2003}
criticizes the lack of quantitative analysis, although agreeing with Learmount’s
holistic approach and the especially the need for political explanations for
Japan’s slow change over the 1990s.) {Hasegawa 2005} also limits himself to a
mostly qualitative analysis, based on short case studies involving interviews of
four manufacturing and four non-manufacturing firms. {Amyx 2004} obtained a
unique database of Ministry of Finance personnel records, but chose to develop
detailed descriptions of the Ministry’s networking into the banking sector and
other agencies, rather than rigorous quantitative tests {Grimes 2005: 395}.
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Table 2 (adapted from {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 23})

Coalitional Lineup

Winner

Coalition
[country
studies]

Label Predicted
case Outcome

Pair A: “class conflict”

Owners (O) + Managers O + M
(M) vs Workers (W)

Investor [Korea]

Diffusion

O + M vs W

W

Labour [Sweden]

Blockholding

O vs M + W

M+W

Corporatist
compromise [Japan,
cf Germany]

Blockholding

O vs M + W

O

Oligarchy [Russia]

Blockholding

O + W vs M

O+W

Transparency [Chile]

Diffusion

O + W vs M

M

Managerism
France]

Pair B: “sectoral” conflict

Pair C: property and voice

[US, Diffusion

Gourevitch and Shinn argue that these more fine-grained
coalitions and tensions, compared for example to studies like {Roe
2003} focusing mainly just on class conflict, better explain
differences among countries and also their continuities or changes.
The countries added in square brackets in the Table above are
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some that they then provide an “analytic narrative” or more
qualitative explanation for, probably necessary as the model grows
in complexity to better fit messy realities. Thus, Germany is seen
as an “corporatist compromise”, gradually unfolding towards a
“transparency” coalition as workers (W) switch allegiance from
managers (M) to owners (O) in an attempt to maintain
employment in a stagnating economy. By contrast {Gourevitch
and Shinn 2005: 167} conclude that:
“Japan is a case of a resilient corporatist compromise,
grounded in a post-World War II historic compromise
between managers and workers that is sustained by
consensual political institutions. Since World War II
there have been no broad changes in preferences towards
governance, and only marginal changes in political
institutions (a partial modification of electoral rules in
1996 [sic: 1994]). As predicted by the corporatist
compromise model, Japanese MSPs remain relatively
low, although concentration [of shareholdings] is also
low. This low level of concentration also has historical
roots, when Japan’s blockholding zaibatsu families were
wiped out by the US Occupation.”
One problem with their model as applied to Japan is the
disjunction between supposedly quite diffuse shareholdings (more
characteristic of US-style corporate governance), and nonetheless
more coordinated policies and consensus-based politics. Even so,
because quantitative analysis deals in aggregates, overall the
model can survive such anomalies provided other countries “fit”
better. Thus, especially if we are interested in one country like
Japan, we need to look carefully at the more qualitative analysis.
There, it is actually arguable that the levels of MSPs and LME
indicators related to “policies”, as well as the complexities of
“politics” especially over the 1990s, involve more US-style
features than the authors concede. At the same time, shareholder
diffusion has been generally seen as much lower than estimated by
{Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 18-19}, as indeed they concede, even
though stable and cross-shareholdings have unwound considerably
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since the late 1990s {Okabe 2002}. Combined, these reassessments
of corporate governance outcomes, policies and politics for Japan
would actually bolster their overall model and conclusions across
countries; but that also requires an acknowledgement of more
change or convergence on the US, or perhaps a new transparency
coalition as in Germany.32 Overall, therefore, their work is a very
promising recent approach focusing particularly on processes
generating the “rules of the game” in corporate governance, not –
like Milhaupt and West, mostly, so far – on how those parameters
then feed back to impact on corporate behaviour.
In analyzing such processes, though, we may need to develop even
more sophisticated models of contemporary politics and policymaking. Recall the suggestion by {Gilson and Milhaupt 2005} that
making Committee-style Boards optional rather than mandatory,
and even then not going as far as the US nowadays in requiring for
example a majority of truly independent directors overall (cf also
{Toda and McCarty 2005}), was due to a compromise among
Japan’s ministries and associated interest groups, which in turn
helps to explain the dispersed effects. Such views find parallels
with the “public choice” explanation for “legislative failure”,
which hypothesizes that more tightly organized groups will tend
to hijack the policy-making process in the pursuit of narrow selfinterest {Ramseyer 1995}.
Generally, however, public choice theory has faced powerful
criticism on empirical grounds, through studies demonstrating
how more diffuse groups have managed to coalesce to become

32

Regarding “policies”, {Nottage 2001} queries the ready characterization of
Japan as a CME rather than a LME, as well as noting quite strong MSPs at least
“on the books” in Japan. More elements of a LME also explain at least some of
the results from the studies by Mark Ramseyer. Regarding “preferences”,
{Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 9} stress that a shift away from pay-as-you-go
public-sector pension schemes as a “substantial driver of new coalitional
possibilities”, and agree with {Dore 2000} that there have been few changes yet
in this area in Japan. Yet they may have over-estimated this factor: their
account also acknowledges few changes in this area in Germany as well.
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effective actors in the political process, and other work showing
how legislators (and their bureaucratic agents) are often motivated
by broader concerns such as ideology and the desire for respect
from their peers {Rubin 2005: 584-7}. Prior “special interests”
theory, emphasizing social elites’ ability to dominate politics, is
more convincing in allowing for the possibility of legislative
success as well as failure. However, it ties such success to
restricting political influence over policy-makers in favour of
neutral and mostly bureaucratic expertise, and generally remains
too narrow and deterministic in emphasizing the power of social
groups and structures. “Pluralism” is more recent variant of this
theory, although it sees legislative success – as well as failure – as
resulting from a political process itself strongly influencing the
formation of groups that struggle to dominate it. “Deliberative
democracy” theory takes a step further this notion of politics as an
independent social process generating its own dynamics and
alliances, by suggesting that politics may also generate individual
or group commitments (rather than just representing them),
potentially achieving more legislative success by allowing
commitments to be redefined through rational public debate.
However, all four theories tend to assume a clear distinction
between good public policy (and hence “legislative success” or
failure) and the political process. {Rubin 2005} views this as
increasingly untenable, descriptively and normatively, and
suggests that we focus more directly on good or bad processes
coupling both policy-making and politics. In particular, he agrees
with empirical studies suggesting that bad processes can be
associated with “conceptual failure” – generating legislation
overly framed by pre-conceived ideas, derived for example from
prior legal concepts (eg {Morag-Levine 2003}). Descriptively, and
indeed normatively, this approach has its attractions for Japan –
but so do theories of pluralism and, perhaps especially,
deliberative democracy. Certainly, compared to special interests
and public choice theories, they seem a more promising way
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forward to understanding distinct shifts in Japan’s policy-making
processes particularly since the late 1990s.33
Even more generally, to further demonstrate the usefulness of
moving away from an obsession with outcomes, even if these
appear more measurable, consider Japan’s recent general election
{Horiuchi et al 2005}. Some might conclude that politics hasn’t
changed in Japan over the 1990s, due to the (hitherto quite
conservative) LDP’s huge victory in the recent election, or at least
the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi’s campaign agenda centred
overwhelmingly on (arguably limited) reforms to the postal
system.34 But others might see the glass to be half full (changing),
rather than half empty (unchanged), or even to be almost full
(radically changed). One way beyond this impasse is instead to
focus on the process or events leading up to this election. Then it
appears much clearer that Japanese politics has changed
considerably. Novel elements include the dissolution of the lower
House to go back directly to the citizenry on a key policy issue;
the abandoning of anti-reform LDP politicians in favour of highprofile outsider (“assassin”) candidates – including high-profile
entrepreneur Takafumi Horie; and even the LDP’s candidates’
“cool biz” style of campaigning in open-necked shirts.35 {Mulgan
2002} therefore seems to have been too quick to predict
“Koizumi’s failed revolution”. Her more recent analysis of
agricultural policy provides “a litmus test of political and policy
change”, since it exemplifies traditional political economy centred
on closely aligned LDP politicians, officials and farmers. After
examining “changes to electoral, bureaucratic and policymaking

33

See eg {Drysdale and Amyx eds 2003}, {Pharr and Schwartz eds 2003},
{Kingston 2004}, {Hook ed 2005}, and {Ohnesorge forthcoming}.
34
Cf {Haley 2005a}, but also the Leader in The Economist (17 September 2005).
The incipient dismantling of the postal savings system, incidentally, does
largely gainsay the views of {Maclachlan 2004}.
35
On the Horie saga, fleshing out {Milhaupt 2005}, see eg {, 2005 #5;, 2005
#7;Hori, 2005 #13;Kojima, 2005 #16;Marquand, 2005 #10;Sanchanta, 2005
#8;Sanchanta, 2005 #9;Suvendrini, 2005 #11}.
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systems, and underlying demographic, political, social and
economic trends”, {Mulgan 2005: 262} concludes that even
“Japanese agricultural politics is in a state of transition as many of
the features of the old model are eroding”, with some changes
more conducive to policy innovation although other elements of
the old politics have reasserted themselves. However,
{McCormack 2005} seems to go too far the other way in describing
the latest election as part of Koizumi’s plan for “the substitution
of a Hayekian, neo-liberal, American way for the Keynesian doken
kokka [“construction state”] redistributive, egalitarian way”,
advanced since the 1970s when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
wrested control of the government’s purse strings away from
Ministry of Finance bureaucrats. Instead, these political outcomes
again seem to represent another gradual transformation. Perhaps
more importantly, and reinforcing this sense of important change,
the Koizumi administration has initiated many broader
“procedural changes in the policymaking process” {Machidori
2005}.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Ultimately, detailed and realistic analyses of corporate governance
changes in Japan, which go to the heart of Japanese capitalism and
socio-legal ordering more generally, must therefore go beyond how
the rules of the game influence the players, and consider why and
how the players redefine the rules. In other words, we must
examine more closely “patterns of policy reform”, as well as
“patterns of corporate adjustment” {Vogel 2005: 153-62}. We can
draw also on a rich theoretical and empirical literature combining
both quantitative and qualitative analysis to show how firms in
Japan and elsewhere not only respond to regulatory environments,
but also attempt to reshape them – without necessarily
“capturing” them, as predicted by public choice theory
({Gunningham et al 2003}; {Howard-Grenville 2005}). Studies along
these lines, focusing on processes and more complex feedback
loops, seem likely to demonstrate significant transformations in
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Japanese corporate and public governance, and perhaps explain
better the modes of change and considerable diversity of outcomes
currently in Japan. Moves in this direction, moreover, will require
more interdisciplinary approaches, with those favouring legal or
economic explanations engaging more with political scientists and
sociologists, paralleling new tendencies in broader studies of
comparative capitalism {Coates 2005}. In ongoing theory-building,
particularly in comparative corporate governance, further insights
can be drawn from lessons from the discipline of comparative law
more generally, as detailed in Part II. These include closer
attention to timing and timeframes for comparisons, selection of
countries, balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic
context, and reflecting on – and disclosing – normative
preferences.
A promising and relatively unexplored area to apply such insights
is CSR, which has emerged as a major topic of debate in Japan
along with narrower corporate governance issues and a loss of
trust in the corporate sector following a series of corporate
scandals since 2000 {Nottage 2006a}. However, analyses of CSR
practices in Japanese firms are of varying reliability and quality.
Again, care must be taken regarding the temporal timeframe
selected {KeizaiDoyukai 2004}, and the countries compared
{Welford 2004}. Because CSR is such a broad concept, seen to go
beyond legal requirements, we may also expect conclusions
viewing or acclaiming relatively slower change. Normative
preferences – skepticism on the part of conservative economists
{Economist2005}, approval on the part of communitarians {Dore
2005} – also need to be kept in mind. Most importantly, however,
the diversity of norm-setting actors in this evolving area –
involving leading firms, business associations, the government,
and an array of NGOs – promises to yield a rich resource further
supporting the conclusion of “the gradual transformation” well
underway in Japan.
More immediately, these broader theoretical points imply first the
necessity for those advocating more stakeholder-focused models of
corporate governance to update their understanding of its evolving
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variant in Japan. In doing so, and for even more practical purposes,
it is crucial to bear in mind the typology of views outlined in Part
I, as well as the emerging consensus that significant but complex
changes continue to play themselves out in Japan.
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APPENDIX A: CORPORATE LAW AMENDMENTS SINCE
1993
Year
(cont’d)

Main Issues
z

1993
z

z

z
1994

z
1997(1)
z

z

z
1997(2)

Corporate governance (limiting
the court filing fee for derivative
actions)
Corporate
governance
(introduction of a board of auditors
in a large company)
Corporate governance (relaxing
the requirement for shareholders
to exercise their right to inspect
the books of the company)
Deregulation on stock repurchase
(lifting
the
prohibition
for
purposes of an employee’s stock
plan or cancellation of the stock)
Introduction of the stock option
system
Deregulation of stock repurchases
(lifting
the
prohibition
for
purposes of a stock option plan)
Deregulation of stock repurchases
(simplifying the procedure by
which public corporations can
repurchase
shares
from
the
market, or by way of a tender offer
also known as a TOB)
Corporate restructuring (merger
procedures)

Remarks

Governmentsponsored Bill

Governmentsponsored Bill

Bill submitted
by
an
individual
politician

Governmentsponsored Bill
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z

Increasing penalty against the
company’s payment to corporate Governmentsponsored Bill
racketeers (sokaiya)

z

Deregulation of stock purchases
(expanding the available funds for Bill submitted
an
a simplified procedure for a public by
individual
corporation)
politician

z

Corporate
restructuring:
introduction of Share-to-Share Governmentsponsored Bill
Exchange and Share-Transfer

z

Corporate
restructuring:
Governmentintroduction of the “demerger”
sponsored Bill

z

Deregulation of stock repurchases
(completely
abolishing
the
prohibition, and lifting the ban on
“treasury stock”)
Deregulation of the minimum size
of shares
Simplifying the procedure relating
to the reduction of statutory
reserve fund
Authorising
the
electronic
documentation
of
corporate
information
Corporate finance (authorising the
company to issue call options for
its shares)
Simplifying the procedure for
stock options
Corporate finance (deregulation of
the issuance of various kinds of
shares)

1997(3)

1998

1999

2000

2001(1)

z
z

z
2001(2)
z

z
z

Bill submitted
by
an
individual
politician

Governmentsponsored Bill
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z
2001(3)
z

z
2002

z
z

z

z
z

z
z
2003

z
2004
z

Corporate governance (authorising
the limitation of a director’s
liability)
Corporate governance (improving
the procedure for derivative
actions)
Corporate governance (creation of
optional
“Company
with
Committees” modelled on the
American corporate governance
system)
Corporate governance (creation of
“Important Asset Committee”)
Corporate governance (relaxing
the requirement for super majority
voting
at
the
shareholders’
meeting)
Corporate
governance/corporate
finance (introduction of class
voting for the election of
management)
Introduction of the registration
system for lost securities
Simplifying
the
reduction
procedure for legal capital and the
mandatory statutory reserve fund
Deregulation of foreign companies
Deregulation of stock repurchases
(simplified procedure for public
corporations to repurchase shares
from the market, or by way of a
tender offer often referred to as a
TOB)
Dematerialisation of corporate
securities
Electronic public notice system
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Bill submitted
by
an
individual
politician

Governmentsponsored Bill

Bill submitted
by
an
individual
politician

Governmentsponsored Bill
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z
2005

z

z

45

Consolidation
of
corporate
legislation into new Companies Government
Act, using modern Japanese sponsored Bills
language Abrogation of Yugen
Gaisha (similar to GmbH in
Germany), generally treated as
Kabushiki Kaisha (AG or joint
stock companies), and new Godo
kaisha
(limited
liability
companies, quite like LLC in the
US) and yugen sekinin jigyo
kumiai
(limited
liability
partnerships, quite like LLP); but
KK divided into large and small
companies either category of
which can be established as
closely or publically (with large
and publically held companies
requiring
a
more
complex
governance structure – including
the option still of a board with
committees; whereas closely held
companies need not always treat
all shareholders equally, statutory
auditors can be limited to
reviewing
only
financial
statements and not business
operations of directors, and all
such officers can have terms
extended for up to 10 years)
For KK, optional accounting
consultant (as an officer to assist
directors in preparing financial
statements), only one director
possible (instead of at least three),
minimum capital requirement
abolished, freedom to distribute
profits whenever (not up to twice
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z

per annum)
Tripartite mergers to allow the
absorbing company in a merger to
provide cash or other assets (eg
parent
company
stocks)
to
shareholders rather than issuing
shares from the newly merged
company
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